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Reliability and Safety Analysis Report (RSAR)
• Risk-based analysis process used for reviewing system design
functions that could contribute hazards to personnel, flight
hardware, facilities , and GSE.
• This analysis provides evidence of hazard mitigation at each
design milestone during the development effort.
• The RSAR determines if the level of system hardware/software
design complexity requires an additional, Failure Modes and
Effects Analysis (FMEA).1
Work Authorization Document (WAD)
WAD Administration
Hazard Analysis 
• EGS is responsible for identifying all hazards associated with
flight and ground system during ground processing.
• Hazards may manifest themselves in developments,
manufacturing/ construction, testing, transporting,
maintenance, and other ground processing and operation
activities.
• The hazard analysis initiates from the formation and design
concept phase and matures throughout the program life
cycle, including verification of hazard controls being in-place
prior to the commencement of ground operations.1
• Verifies technical compliance with Program requirements,
drawings, and specifications.
• Makes the work instructions clear to ensure that the
document’s intent can be met.
• Provides traceability to the person(s) performing the work.
• Provides a complete and accurate history of the work
performed.
• Is important that every WAD work step contains sufficient
detail and appropriate verification buy-points for a list of
authorized personnel traceability.
RSAR Contents
1. Hazards/Risk to Safety of Personnel.
2. Hazards/ Risks to Safety of Flight Hardware, Facilities, GSE, 
and Environment. 
3. Hazards/ Risks Associated with Safety System Functions. 
4. Heritage equipment. 
5. Critical Items.  
• Over 70 Documents were utilized to find and mitigate possible 
hazard scenarios. Ex: LH2 Standards, Software, Purge, Valve 
Actuation, Power, Schematics and Heritage Components.
Hazard Report Contents
1. Hazardous  Condition Description.
2. Acceptance Rationale. 
3. Likelihood Justification. 
4. Causes of Hazard. 
5. Controls and verifications.
• Currently finding controls and verifications that will help 
mitigate the hazardous condition and causes.
The Space Launch System (SLS) has two liquid cryogenic stages,
Core Stage (CS) and Upper Stage (UP). The CS and the US require
Liquid Hydrogen (LH2) and Liquid Oxygen (LO2) to generate ascent
thrust. Exploration Ground Systems (EGS) will provide an integrated
LH2 Subsystem to service the SLS.2
The Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) program will conduct the
Ascent Abort 2 (AA-2) flight test to demonstrate that Launch Abort
System (LAS) can execute an ascent abort under high dynamic
pressure conditions.
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Ascent Abort Flight Test
The WAD Administration will help keep a constant communication
between WAD authors and safety experts to ensure all possible
hazards are listed and taken in consideration when personnel are
performing the task.
WAD Review Process
1. Receive notification “document ready for review” from the 
contractor. 
2. Assign documents to the appropriate safety staff. 
3. Format/compile safety staff comments.  
4. Send feedback to contractor. 
5. Comment discussion/ closure meeting is performed.
6. Create database entries to record safety revisions for 
Certification of Flight Readiness (CoFR). 
• References:1Ingratta, James. GSDO Program Safety and Mission Assurance Plan. NASA 
Kennedy Space Center, June 1, 2018.2 Lobmeyer, D. Concept of Operations SLS LH2 
System. NASA Kennedy Space Center, July 15, 2016. 
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